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This paper utilizes panel data from El Salvador to investigate the use of trans-national
migration as an ex post risk management strategy. We show that adverse agricultural
conditions in El Salvador increase both migration to the US and remittances sent back to
El Salvador. We show that, in the absence of any agricultural shocks, the probability that
ah o u s e h o l ds e n tm e m b e r st ot h eU Sw o u l dh a v ed e c r e a s e db y2 4 . 2 6 % ,o na v e r a g e . W ea l s o
show that the 2001 earthquakes reduced net migration to the US. A one standard deviation
increase in earthquake damage reduced the average probability of northward migration by
37.11%. The evidence suggests that the eﬀects of the earthquakes had more to do with
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1households retaining labor at home to cope with the eﬀects of the disaster rather than the
earthquakes disrupting migration ﬁnancing.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O1
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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature in development economics that has investigated how households in
LDC’s cope with exogenous economic shocks in the face of imperfect insurance markets.1 This
literature consists of two strands. In the ﬁrst, researchers have looked at informal means of
allocating risk across space in which households within a group such as a village insure each other
via state-contingent transfers.2 In the second strand, researchers have looked at the household’s
use of asset accumulation and depletion, in autarky, as a means of self-insurance.3 This paper
1For a more thorough overview of the literature on savings, credit and insurance arrangements in developing
countries, we refer the reader to Besley (1995).
2For example, Udry (1994a) looks at the role that state-contingent credit contracts play in risk management
for households in northern Nigeria. He ﬁnds that repayment depends not only on shocks to the borrower but
also to the lender. This result is not consistent with a standard model of loan contracting; rather, it has more
in common with a model of cross-sectional risk pooling. In a related work, Townsend (1994) uses the ICRISAT
data set to look at villages in India and concludes that idiosyncratic risk matters relatively little for household
consumption once he controls for village level risk. Despite ﬁnding evidence of cross-sectional risk sharing, both
papers reject the null of eﬃcient risk sharing, although Townsend concludes that the complete markets paradigm
fairs reasonably well in the ICRISAT data. However, Chaudhuri and Raviollion (1997) provide a comment to
Townsend’s work. Their work indicates that a particular form of measurement error in Townsend’s consumption
data may have been a potentially important factor that biased some of Townsend’s results towards the null
of eﬃcient risk sharing. Their work lends credence to Deaton (1992) who claims that the co-movements in
consumption that are observed in the ICRISAT data may be rationalized by an autarkic model of savings in
which diﬀerent households receive common signals concerning future income.
3In one example, Udry (1994b) looks at a sample of rural dwellers from northern Nigeria and ﬁnds that grain
inventories grow more slowly upon the receipt of adverse shocks. In a similar piece, Paxson (1992) tests the
2adds to this part of the literature by treating the number of migrants within a household as a
productive asset and investigating how and why various exogenous economic shocks aﬀect its
movement.
There has been substantial work on the use of migration as a means of mitigating risk prior to
t h eo c c u r r e n c eo fas h o c k ,o ra sa nex ante risk management strategy (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989;
Paulson 2000). However, there has been surprisingly little work done on the use of migration
as a means of mitigating risk after the occurrence of a shock, or as an ex post risk management
strategy. Helping to ﬁll this void is this paper’s main objective.
To accomplish this, we use a panel of rural households from El Salvador. The data that
we employ in this paper cover the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. They contain information on
the number of migrants per household. Because we have a panel, we are able to measure the
household’s migrant ﬂow through the diﬀerence in migrant stocks across two time periods. Since
our data come from El Salvador and not the US, we are better able to account for illegal as well
as legal migration. In addition, we have good data on exogenous events that aﬀect the household
in El Salvador. These events come from two sources. The ﬁrst is agricultural conditions which
caused livestock loss and/or harvest loss during the years 1999 and 2001. The second is damage
sustained by the household due to the 2001 earthquakes. Because the ﬁnal survey was ﬁelded in
the beginning of 2002 and the earthquakes occurred in the beginning of 2001, it provides good
measurement of the earthquake’s eﬀects.
El Salvador provides us with an excellent laboratory for this work due to the high volume
Permanent Income Hypothesis with a sample of rural farmers in Thailand using rainfall data. She ﬁnds that farm
households save a signiﬁcantly larger portion of transitory income than permanent income, thereby suggesting
that savings is used to smooth consumption from transitory income ﬂuctuations. In another study, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993) show that farmers in India are more apt to sell bullocks when they experience low proﬁts.
3of migration in the country. While Salvadoran migration to the US was somewhat common
prior to 1980, it gained momentum in the eighties primarily due to a civil war which was fought
during that decade. Upon the signing of the peace accords in 1992 by the government and
the FMLN, the umbrella group for the opposition during the war, now a political party, many
expected that these migrant ﬂows would abate. However, this has proven not to be the case.
Indeed, according to the 2000 US Census, the number of Salvadorans in the US is estimated to
be 784,700. In contrast, the 1990 census estimate is 418,800 (Ruggles, Sobek, et al. 2003).4,5
Our results indicate that these large migrant ﬂows are, in part, aﬀected by the economic
conditions which prevail in El Salvador. We ﬁnd that adverse agricultural shocks such as har-
vest and livestock loss have large and positive eﬀects on the household’s probability of sending
members to the US. In particular, in the absence of any agricultural shocks, on average, the
probability that a household sent members to the US would have dropped by 24.26%. We also
ﬁnd that households that experience adverse agricultural conditions also experience increases in
remittances that are on the order of 40% to 60%.
In contrast, our results indicate that the dollar amount of damage due to the earthquakes
is associated with a substantial decrease in net migration to the US. A one standard deviation
increase in damage lowers the probability of migration to the US by 37.11%. One explanation
for this ﬁnding is that the earthquakes created exigencies in El Salvador which increased the
incentives for families to retain labor at home. This explanation states that the labor of potential
4Of course, due to the diﬃculty of counting undocumented workers, it is likely that this number provides us
with a lower bound of the actual number of Salvadorans residing in the US. Indeed, many estimate that the
actual number is now well above one million (PNUD 2001). In a country of just over six million people, this has
astounding implications for the number of Salvadorans residing abroad.
5In addition, the high prevalence of Salvadorans in the US has had signiﬁcant implications for the volume
of money remitted to El Salvador from the US each year. In fact, the Salvadoran government estimates that
remittances contributed 1.75 billion dollars to the Salvadoran GNP in 2000 (PNUD 2001; MRE 2001). This
amount accounted for 13% of the Salvadoran GNP in 2000.
4and existing migrants was used to buﬀer the eﬀects of the earthquakes. Another explanation
for this result is that Salvadoran households are liquidity constrained and that the earthquakes
disrupted migration ﬁnancing either through depleting savings or restricting access to credit.
To investigate the role that liquidity constraints play, we look into the relationship between
household wealth, migration and the earthquakes. The basic idea behind this exercise is that
wealthier households are less likely to be credit constrained and, hence, better able to ﬁnance
migration As expected if households are liquidity constrained, we ﬁnd that higher levels of
wealth are associated with a higher probability of migration. However, we also ﬁnd that the
earthquakes stunted migration to the US at all wealth levels. Thus, the earthquakes appear
t oh a v eh a da sm u c ho fa ne ﬀect on wealthier households, who are less likely to be liquidity
constrained, as they had on poorer households, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained.
Accordingly, the evidence in this paper does not support the hypotheses that the earthquakes
stunted migration as a consequence of the disruption of migration ﬁnancing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data.
Section 3 looks into the impact of exogenous shocks on migration and remittances. Section
4 explores alternative explanations for the results of Section 3. In Section 5, we extend the
analysis of Section 3 and look into the role that liquidity constraints play. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e D a t a
5The data that we employ come from the BASIS research program in El Salvador at The Ohio
State University. The data set is a panel of rural households in El Salvador.6 We employ data
on migration, remittances, demographic characteristics and wealth from the 1997, 1999 and 2001
waves of the survey as well as data on exogenous shocks from the 1999 and 2001 waves. The
data contain household identiﬁers, so it is possible to track households across time. Variable
deﬁnitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 1. Table 2 reports sample sizes by
year.
2.1 Migration
The primary migration variables that we work with are Migrants and Remittances. Precisely,
we deﬁne a migrant to be anyone in the household who, at the time of the survey year, was
residing in the US or Canada.7 The average number of migrants per household in our data is
0.55. 26.44% of all households report having at least one migrant. Among the households who
r e p o r th a v i n gm i g r a n t s ,t h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fm i g r a n t sp e rh o u s e h o l di s2 . 0 8 . R e m i t t a n c e si sa
measure of the total amount of money sent back from the US to the household in El Salvador in a
given time period. The average remittance level per household is $303.29. However, conditional
on having at least one migrant residing in the US, the average remittance level rises to $1110.98.
6El Salvador is divided into 14 departments which, in turn, are divided into municipios which are further
subdivided into cantones. Households are deﬁned to be rural if they live in a cantón that is not the capital of
their municipio. Several cantones within the municipio of San Salvador were not classiﬁed as rural due to the
expansion of the capital city.
7Ap e r s o ni sd e ﬁned to be a household member if they are either tied to the household by blood by or by
marriage.
62.2 Shocks
Our shocks come from two sources. The ﬁr s ts o u r c ei sh o u s e h o l ds p e c i ﬁc agricultural conditions
which prevailed during the years 1999 and 2001. The second source is the earthquakes of 2001.
2.2.1 Agricultural Shocks
Our measures of household-speciﬁc agricultural shocks come from two events: livestock loss and
harvest loss. In the 2001 and 1999 panels of the data, the enumerators solicited information
concerning whether or not the household experienced income loss due to either event. If the
household indicated that they did lose income as a consequence of any of these events then
Harvest Loss or Livestock Loss equals one; otherwise, it equals zero. Similar self-reported
shocks have been used by Udry (1994a and 1994b) in his work on risk management in Nigeria.8
We report the distribution of our agricultural shocks in Table 3. For both the 2001 data
and the 1999 data, 25.99% of all households experienced at least one agricultural shock. The
prevalence of shocks was substantially higher in the 2001 panel. The percentage of households
experiencing shocks rose from 16.67% in 1999 to 35.41% in 2001. One possible reason for this
dramatic increase was the drought of 2001.9 Finally, the majority of households who experienced
agricultural shocks did so due to harvest loss; however, a non-trivial number of households, 149
or 10.76% of all households present in 1999 and 2001, also experienced livestock losses.
8Because the survey design diﬀered slightly across 1999 and 2001, the construction of the harvest loss variable
warrants some more exposition. In 1999, the household was deﬁned to have experienced a harvest loss if they
reported that they lost all or part of their harvest and that this event caused them to lose income. In 2001,
the household was deﬁned to have experienced a harvest loss if they reported that the value of their harvest was
less than normal as a consequence of a drought which occurred in 2001. Unfortunately, the 1999 survey did not
solicit the actual cause of the harvest loss and, hence, it is not possible to have comparable measures of harvest
losses in 1999 and 2001. To address this issue, we estimated our models separately for 1999 and 2001 to ensure
that the results were comparable in the two years and they were.
9In El Salvador, the rainy season occurs between May and October. During the months of June and July,
there is a dry period called the “canicula.” Droughts typically occur when the canicula is longer than normal.
72.2.2 Earthquake Shocks
The earthquakes of 2001 provide us with a second shock. The earthquakes occurred on January
13 and February 13 of 2001. The ﬁrst earthquake registered 7.6 on the Richter scale and killed
a total of 844 people. The second earthquake registered 6.6 on the Richter scale and killed
an additional 315 people. Out of El Salvador’s approximate six million people, it is estimated
that over one million people were left without adequate shelter by the middle of February 2001
(Nicolás and Olson 2001).
Earthquake Damage, our second shock, is an index that measures the extent to which the
dwelling of a household was aﬀected by the 2001 earthquakes. It is equal to the log of the total
cost of the damage sustained. Damage came from numerous sources. Table 4 describes in detail
all the sources of damage from the earthquakes that are used to construct the index. As can be
seen in the table, home damage was the principal source of damage. In our data, the dwellings of
59.6% of households were aﬀected in some way by the earthquakes. 31.6% of households reported
that they sustained at least major damage to their homes. 17% of households reported having
their homes destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. This number coincides with the estimate that
approximately 1 out of 6 Salvadorans was left w i t h o u ta d e q u a t eh o u s i n gi nt h ew a k eo ft h e
disaster, thereby, suggesting that our measure of the earthquake shock is good.10 Finally, the
average cost of damage among households who actually sustained damage was $5202.12. Figure
1 displays the density of Earthquake Damage for each of El Salvador’s 14 departments.
10It is not possible that the statistics from this study were constructed with the BASIS data since the study
was released in mid-2001 and the BASIS survey was ﬁelded in 2002.
82.3 Demographic Characteristics
We also use demographic controls. To control for household composition, we construct mea-
sures of the number of household members residing at home in El Salvador within certain age
and gender brackets for all home dwellers. We only focus on the demographic composition of
the household at home in El Salvador in the coming analysis since we are primarily interested
in controlling for the eﬀects of young children and elderly household members on migration de-
cisions.11 Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for our household demographic variables.
We report the mean and standard deviations for the number of household members within each
age/gender bracket.12 Finally, we employ data on the education of the household head. These
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
2.4 Wealth
We employ data on the household’s total land holdings, which are measured in manzanas as a
proxy for wealth.13,14 We use three measures which are deﬁned in Table 1. The ﬁrst measure,
Land 1, includes all the holdings of the household for which there is either a title or documents
11The age brackets that we employ are: less than age 6, between ages 6 and 10, between ages 11 and 15,
between ages 16 and 20, between ages 21 and 40, between ages 41 and 60 and older than age 60.
12Interestingly, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the gender composition of the household for household
members less than or equal to 20 years of age. However, we do observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences in household
composition across gender for household members older than 20 years. In particular, we observe that there are
signiﬁcantly less male household members residing in El Salvador between the ages of 21 and 60. The reason
for this is that there is a relative abundance of men between these ages residing in the US. What is not clear,
however, is why there are signiﬁcantly more men over the age of 60. Presumably, this reﬂects a weakness in our
data.
13One manzana equals 6988 square meters.
14An alternative proxy for wealth in the BASIS data is savings. However, only about 20% of households have
positive savings in our data in the years 1999 and 2001, whereas, roughly 50% to 60% of households have positive
land holdings in these years depending on which measure we use. Consequently, we felt that land holdings was
a more comprehensive proxy of wealth for our sample.
9indicating the power of transfer.15 The second measure, Land 2, is Land 1 plus any land that
the household may be using with no proper legal documentation.16 The third measure, Land 3,
is the least inclusive. It only includes land that has a title. Our preferred measure is Land 1 as
it is comprehensive, but not so comprehensive that it includes land that households would have
diﬃculty selling. However, we also use the other measures as a robustness check.
2.5 Attrition in the BASIS Panel
An important issue to consider when working with panel data is attrition, particularly, whether
or not it occurs randomly. Table 2 provided some insights into attrition in the BASIS data.
The table showed that roughly 92% of the original households in 1997 survived until 2001 so
that attrition was about 8% over a four year period. Between 1999 and 2001, attrition was less
than 4%.17,18
15Speciﬁcally, the survey asks the household whether or not they have a “título” or an “acta de transferencia
de dominio.” The latter does not have the same legal guarantees as a title, but can used as a means of obtaining
a title. However, due to reasons associated with poverty and lack of education many people with the acta
de transferencia do not take the necessary steps to obtain a title. I thank Alvaro Trigueros of FUSADES for
clarifying this point. 2.8% of households in our data had land with an acta de transferencia but no title. 49.7%
of households in the data had land with a title.
1611.6% of the households in our data had land with no proper documentation.
17Unfortunately, we do not know whether households left the survey because they migrated, died or refused
to respond. However, according to economists at FUSADES, a policy-oriented think-tank in El Salvador which
shared responsibilities for administering the survey along with the Ohio State University, there is a common
belief that migration was the primary cause of attrition. This accords well with Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith
(2001) who provide direct evidence that migration was the primary cause of attrition in the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS).
18It is informative to compare attrition in the BASIS data with that of other more commonly used panels. In
the IFLS, for example, there were three waves in 1993, 1997 and 1998. Between 1993 and 1997, attrition was
6%. Interestingly, between 1993 and 1998, attrition was actually lower at 5%. This low rate of attrition is quite
remarkable given that attrition in panels from developing countries is notoriously high. It is also remarkable
given that attrition in some commonly used American panels is substantially higher. For example, in the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, attrition was about 12% between 1968 and 1969 - a one year time period. In a more
current survey, the Health and Retirement Survey, attrition was about 9% between 1991 and 1993. Thomas,
Frankenberg and Smith (2001) credit a conscientious eﬀort at tracking movers for the low rate of attrition in the
IFLS. Indeed, it is reassuring that attrition in the BASIS data is lower than many panels from the developing
world and even some from the developed world, although it is substantially higher than the IFLS.
10A useful exercise when thinking about the potential impact that attrition may have on estima-
tion is to regress variables indicating survival in the panel on baseline household characteristics.
This is a common exercise in the literature on panel attrition. For more information, we refer
the reader to Gottschalk, Fitzgerald and Moﬃt (1998) and Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith
(2001). We report the results in Table 6.19,20
We are careful to include variables indicating how prone the household is to shocks. In
the ﬁrst, second and third columns, we included the percentage of households in a municipio
in 1999 and 2001 that experienced harvest and livestock loss.21 In column three, we simply
included the harvest loss and livestock loss variables from 1999. Also, we included the mean
of earthquake damage within municipios in all four columns. The logic behind this is that if
proneness to shocks is correlated with survival then this could generate potentially serious biases
in the estimation of the impact of shocks on migration, particularly since the attrition literature
has shown that panel survival is negatively correlated with migration.22
The results do not reveal many signiﬁcant predictors of attrition. Land holdings is by far
the most important with more landed households more likely to survive. This is not surprising
given that households with more land are, presumably, less mobile and, hence, easier to track
across survey years. In terms of the coming estimation, this is not of tremendous concern as any
19Right-hand side variables include baseline characteristics such as land holdings, a dummy indicating positive
land holdings, number of migrants, the head’s education, a dummy indicating that the household size is one,
household size, the demographic variables described in Section 2.3 and department dummies.
20The ﬁrst two columns estimate the probability of surviving from 1997 to 2001. The third column estimates
the probability of surviving from 1999 to 2001 and the fourth column estimates the probability of surviving from
1997 to 1999. In the ﬁrst, second and fourth columns, baseline characteristics are from the 1997 survey. In
the third column, which looks into survival from 1999 to 2001, the baseline characteristics come from the 1999
survey.
21El Salvador is divided into 14 departments which are further divided into municipios
22Ideally, if we had shocks from all of the baselines, we would have looked at whether or not households that
received shocks were also more likely to leave the panel. This type of exercise was only possible using 1999 as
the baseline with the agricultural shocks, but it was not possible with 1997 as the baseline since the survey did
not solicit information on shocks in that year. Consequently, we used municipio-level aggregates.
11potential bias that this might cause can be mitigated by controlling for land holdings. Turning
to the shock variables, we see that the tests of joint-signiﬁcance on the agricultural shocks are
all soundly rejected both with and without the department dummies. There is some evidence,
however, in the ﬁrst and last columns that proneness to earthquake damage is weakly correlated
w i t hs u r v i v a l . T h i si sp o t e n t i a l l yp r o b l e m a t i ca n dw ea d d r e s st h i si s s u ei nS e c t i o n4 .
3 Migration, Remittances and Risk
3.1 The Impact of Shocks on Migration
We begin by estimating the response of the household’s migration decision to shocks in El
Salvador. Let Mh,t denote the migrant stock of household h at time t.L e t ∆Mh,t denote
the change in the household’s migrant stock across survey years. Let ωh,t denote a vector of
exogenous events that aﬀect the household at time t which includes Harvest Loss, Livestock Loss
and Earthquake Damage. Next, we let Zh,t denote a vector of household demographic variables
w h i c hw e r ed e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n2 . 3 . 23 Finally, we let Xh,t denote other control variables such
as location dummies and time dummies. This notation is held throughout the balance of the
paper.
23In this section we do not address the eﬀects of household wealth on migration. The reason for this is
that wealth has a positive eﬀect on both northward migration (i.e. ∆Mh,t > 0) and southward migration (i.e.
∆Mh,t < 0) in our data and the parsimonious econometric model that we work with in this section does not allow
for such non-monotonicity. We reserve a discussion of the eﬀects of wealth on migration for Section 5 when we
address the role that liquidity constraints play in migration decisions.
12To assess the impact of shocks on migration, we estimate the ordered response model
1(∆Mh,t = n)=1 ( αn−1 ≤ δ1ωh,t + δ2Xh,t + δ3Zh,t−1 + εh,t <α n) (1)
for n∈ {...,−1,0,1,...}.
αn denotes the nth ancillary parameter. We assume that εh,t is independent of the vector
(ωh,t,X h,t,Z h,t−1) and follows a logistic distribution. The advantage of the ordered response
model in equation (1) is that the additional ancillary parameters allow us to handle ∆Mh,t in a
ﬂexible manner. We are careful to include lags of the household’s demographic characteristics.
We do this since migration decisions today will aﬀect the household’s demographic composition
in the present period.
Table 7 presents the results.24,25 In all ﬁve columns, we see that adverse agricultural condi-
tions in El Salvador had a positive eﬀect on migration and, thus, tended to push people out of
the country. The variables, Livestock Loss and Harvest Loss, are all positive and individually
signiﬁcant at the 10% level and they are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level.26 These results are
24The standard errors in this table (and all of the tables in the coming analysis) allow for clustering within
municipios. We do so for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that we often work with the same household observed across
multiple time periods. The second is that we expect many of our variables, particularly the shocks, to be spatially
correlated. Accordingly, standard errors that assume that the data are distributed i.i.d. will be incorrect. For a
more thorough discussion of clustering, we refer the reader to Deaton (1997). However, it is important to state
that while the asymptotic justiﬁcation for this procedure is clear in linear models, this justiﬁcation is less clear
in non-linear models as it would seem that correlated unobservables would fundamentally alter the likelihood
function. Nevertheless, we admonish the reader to view this clustering procedure as a “down and dirty” solution
to the problem of spatial correlation.
25We also have a version of the results in this table using the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) Scheme
developed by Moﬃtt, Fitzgerald and Gottschalk (1999). This procedure corrects for a particular form of attrition
bias which occurs when the attrition is aﬀected by observable characteristics in the ﬁrst time period, but is
unaﬀected by outcomes which occur in subsequent time periods. The results are very similar and are available
upon request. Despite this, however, it is important not to place too much stock in the IPW results as attrition
in our case is often being caused by migration and this type of attrition cannot be accommodated by IPW.
26We also estimated these models individually using only single years of the panel. While, not surprisingly, the
estimates are less precise, they still paint the same picture as Table 7. What is interesting about this exercise
is that we know that the primary cause of agricultural shocks in 2001 was a draught. Moreover, we know for
13consistent with Munshi (2003) who shows that low rainfall in Mexico has a positive impact on
migration to the US.
The relationship between agricultural shocks and migration suggests that households who
experienced agricultural losses anticipated low expected returns to their labor at home for the
foreseeable future and, thus, a widened north-south wage gap. Consequently, the shocks may
have created additional incentives to send household members to the US and disincentives for
existing migrants to return to El Salvador. In addition, as we will see, there is some evidence
that the eﬀects of the agricultural shocks on migration are accompanied by rises in remittances.
In contrast, the table shows that the earthquakes had a negative impact on migration. The
earthquake damage index is negative and signiﬁcant in columns 1 and 3. In column 2, we include
a dummy variable indicating whether or not the household was aﬀected by the disaster, in lieu,
of the index. The dummy variable, which tells us the average impact of the earthquakes, is
negative and moderately signiﬁcant. In columns 4 and 5, we include 14 department dummies
and 167 municipio dummies, respectively, and we see that the standard error on Earthquake
Damage is larger, but the point estimate is similar to what it was in column 3.27,28
certain that every harvest loss in our data in 2001 was reported as a consequence of this draught. This then
casts serious doubt on an alternative story of reverse causality in which the shock resulted as a consequence of
less eﬀort being expended on the household’s farm after the departure of a family member.
27As we are clustering on municipios, our asymptotics are with respect to municipios, not households. Given
that we are estimating a non-linear model, the inclusion of municpio dummies creates the famous incidental
parameters problem of Neyman and Scott (1948) where the number or parameters increases with the sample size
(the number of clusters). However, while inclusion of municpio dummies may not be appropriate on theoretical
grounds, the parameter estimates are similar with and without the municipio dummies, thereby, suggesting that
the incidental parameters problem is of little concern here.
28It is important to address the pros and cons of the location dummies. First, using municipio dummies,
creates an eﬃciency loss since their inclusion relies on variation in shocks within municipios. All variation in the
shocks across municipios gets absorbed by the location dummies. This is desirable as it addresses any concerns
about correlations between shocks and location eﬀects. However, it is undesirable since variation that occurs
across municipios is potentially useful information that does not get utilized and this results in an eﬃciency
loss. This is particularly undesirable as eﬃciency is not something that is relatively abundant in shorts panels
with small sample sizes and noisy data. Indeed, it may be the case that the cure is worse than the sickness.
Second, El Salvador is roughly the size of Massachusetts. El Salvador is divided into fourteen departments and
14Excluding stories involving non-random assignment of the shocks (which we consider later),
the ﬁnding that the earthquakes had a negative impact on migration is consistent with two
explanations. The ﬁrst is that the earthquakes created exigencies which caused households to
retain members at home or bring members back from the US in order to help the family recover
from the disaster’s eﬀects. The second explanation is that the earthquakes were an enormous
burden on the household’s ﬁnancial resources which prohibited the household from putting up the
capital necessary to send members abroad.29 In Section 5, we investigate the role that liquidity
constraints play in household’s migration decisions and, in doing so, attempt to disentangle these
explanations from one-another.
To give the reader some notion of the magnitude of these shocks, we calculate their marginal
impacts. The results are in Table 8. Detail concerning how the marginal eﬀects were calculated
can be found in the appendix. We see that, in the absence of any agricultural shocks, the
probability of sending members abroad in both years (northward migration) decreases from 0.2650
to 0.2007 - a 24.26% decrease. The probability of receiving members (southward migration)
increases from 0.0914 to 0.1262 - a 38.07% increase. Turning to the earthquakes, we see that
a one standard deviation increase in the level of damage lowers the probability of northward
migration in 2001 from 0.2328 to 0.1464 - a 37.11% change. In contrast, the probability of
southward migration goes from 0.1073 to 0.1682 - a 56.76% increase.
3.2 The Impact of Shocks on Remittances
Massachusetts is divided into fourteen counties. Consequently, we believe that it is reasonable to expect that
department dummies may adequately control for location eﬀects without incurring the same eﬃciency costs as
the municpio dummies.
29“Illegal” migration to the US from El Salvador typically requires payments to smugglers or coyotes that can
exceed $1500 (Menjívar 2000).
15We now turn to the eﬀects of exogenous shocks in El Salvador on migrant remittances. Let rh,t
denote the amount remitted by all migrants in household h at time t in logs and let Rh,t denote
remittances in levels. Using the notation from above for the other variables, we estimate the
simple linear models







= γ0 + γ1ωh,t + γ2Xh,t + γ3Zh,t−1 + υh,t (3)
to identify the eﬀects of exogenous shocks on migrant remittances. Equation (2) tells us the
impact of shocks on total migrant remittances and equation (3) tells us the impact of shocks on
remittances per migrant. Equation (3) is of interest as it is informative of cross-sectional risk
sharing within spatially diversiﬁed households. In other words, it is suggestive of whether or not
a given migrant remits more when their family at home experiences adversity.30
Table 9 reports the results. In the ﬁrst column, we see that - consistent with Table 7
- that agricultural shocks are associated with higher remittances. However, the inclusion of
the department and municipio dummies attenuates the impact of livestock loss and takes away
the impact of harvest loss. Our estimates indicate that a livestock loss results in an increase
in migrant remittances that is on the order of 40-60% whereas the ﬁrst column suggests that
households that experienced a harvest loss witnessed an increase in remittances on the order
of 40%.31 In addition, we see that the earthquakes are associated with decreases in the total
30We also estimated the remittance equation using a standard Tobit model. The results are similar to the OLS
results. In order to save space, the results are not reported, but they are available upon request. We attempted
to use the Censored Least Absolute Deviations model of Powell (1984), but were unsuccessful as the remittance
data contain too much censoring.
31See footnote 27 for a discussion of the pro and cons of location eﬀects.
16amount remitted from the US. The elasticities of total migrant remittances with respect to
earthquake damage in the ﬁrst three columns are -0.11, -0.06, and -0.04, respectively. Finally,
the eﬀects of the earthquakes in Table 9 remain signiﬁcant after the department dummies are
added suggesting that the marginally signiﬁcant estimates in the last two columns of Table 7
were most likely the consequence of increased imprecision due to the addition of location eﬀects.
The basic lesson that we learn in the ﬁrst three columns of the table is that shocks aﬀect
total migrant remittances the same way that they aﬀect migration - although, the results do
become more imprecise with the addition of location eﬀects. Agricultural shocks pushed people
to the US and increased remittances, whereas the earthquakes pulled people back and decreased
remittances. In this sense, the results in Table 9 reinforce those in Table 7.
The last two columns of Table 9 report the results of estimating equation (3). In both
columns, we see that the agricultural shocks had positive impacts on remittances per migrant,
although, when we include the department dummies, harvest loss is no longer signiﬁcant. This
is suggestive, but by no means conclusive, that, not only do households self-insure against agri-
cultural shocks via migration (i.e.. changes in their migrant stocks across time), but also that
households that are hit by agricultural shocks insure themselves in the cross-section via increases
in intra-household transfers (i.e. changes in the amount remitted per migrant).
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of the earthquakes, we see negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects on remittances
per migrant. This is interesting as it does not suggest that existing migrants remitted more
in order to insure their families against the disaster’s consequences as one would expect if the
household were engaging in cross-sectional risk sharing through state-contingent transfers. One
explanation for this coeﬃcient is that households that were hit by the earthquakes valued the
17labor of potential and existing migrants more than they valued their remittances. However,
a more plausible explanation is that households that were more likely to be aﬀected by the
earthquakes also received fewer remittances per migrant from abroad prior to their occurrence.
In other words, earthquake damage may have been non-randomly assigned to households who
were less likely to receive remittances. The next section discusses the implications of this for the
core results of Table 7 and provides evidence that earthquake damage was most likely assigned
non-randomly, but also that this was probably not responsible for the results in Table 7.
This discussion highlights some of the pitfalls of OLS estimation of equations (2) and (3) to
identify the impact of shocks on remittances. The ﬁrst concerns potential correlation between
the shocks and omitted household characteristics resulting from non-random assignment. One
seemingly sensible remedy to this would be ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. However, while it is true that
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation does address many problems concerning omitted variables, it comes with
considerable eﬃciency loss.32 Consequently, given our data, we believe that the costs of ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimation greatly outweigh its beneﬁts.33 Another pitfall associated with estimation
of the remittance equations concerns measurement error in remittances. While it is true that
measurement error in dependent variables will only result in asymptotic biases if it is correlated
with right-hand side variables, in ﬁnite samples it may still be problematic as it adds additional
noise to our estimator that is only zero in a large sample.
32As pointed out by Deaton (1995), addressing unobserved heterogeneity is not free. For example, one important
issue concerns the role that serial correlation in the agricultural shocks plays. If there is positive serial correlation
(which there is in our data), demeaning results in a substantial loss of variation and, thus, greater imprecision. A
second issue concerns the role of measurement error. Generally, demeaning will exacerbate the role of measurement
error which, in the case of the agricultural shocks, should bias the estimates toward zero (see Aigner (1973) for a
discussion of measurement error with binary regressors). These caveats are especially important to bear in mind
given our small sample size and our short panel.
33We do have a set of ﬁxed-eﬀects results which are available upon request. These results, not surprisingly, are
less precise. Nevertheless, they still paint a similar picture to what we have been seeing throughout this paper.
184 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we explore some alternative explanations for the previous section’s results. We
consider the possibility that migration is used to hedge risk ex ante as opposed to ex post as
well as the possibility that the shocks were assigned non-randomly to households with varying
wealth levels and/or ties to the US. We also investigate the possibility that the previous section’s
results were, at least, in part the consequence of non-random attrition. We now discuss of these
competing hypotheses.
Ex Ante Risk Management It is conceivable that the previous section’s eﬀects of the
agricultural shocks are capturing the use of migration as an ex ante risk coping strategy. The
reason for this is that households which are engaged in risky agricultural activities may also
engage in migration as a means of hedging against risk prior to the occurrence of any shocks.
This suggests that agricultural shocks were more likely to be assigned to households that engage
in migration as opposed to households actually migrating in response to the shock.
Non-Random Assignment to Households with Weak Ties to the US The eﬀects
of the earthquakes on migration may be the consequence of the earthquakes disproportionately
impacting households with weaker ties to the US as opposed to families utilizing household labor
to buﬀer their eﬀects. One might expect this to happen since much research has shown that
migrant networks play important roles in the household’s migration decision in the sense that
households with migrants already residing in the US are more likely to send additional members
19abroad (see Massey et al. 1987 for a discussion).34
Non-Random Assignment to Poorer Households A similar concern to the previous
one is that the earthquakes hit poorer households.35 This is potentially problematic if households
are liquidity constrained, especially, given the large cost of migration. As a result, it could be
the case that households that were hit by the earthquakes would not have migrated irrespective
of whether or not they were aﬀected by the earthquakes.36 While the exercises in this section
shed some light on this issue, we provide a more thorough investigation in Section 5.
Non-Random Attrition Attrition can also play a pernicious role in the estimation. For
the agricultural shocks, we would not expect much of a bias since the results of Section 2.5 did
not reveal any relationship between the agricultural shocks and attrition. However, we did ﬁnd
some evidence that households that resided in areas that were hit hard by the earthquakes were
also more likely to survive in the panel. This is worrisome given that Thomas, Frankenberg and
Smith (2001) provide evidence that migration was a major cause of attrition in the Indonesian
Family Life Survey. Taken together, this suggests that survivors were more likely to be hit by
the earthquakes and, at the same time, less likely to migrate. This implies that our estimates
of the impact of the earthquakes may be negatively biased due to non-random attrition.37
34Similar arguments can be made for the agricultural shocks with harvest and livestock losses being more likely
to hit households with stronger network ties.
35This does appear to be the case in our data.
36Once again, similar arguments can be made for the agricultural shocks.
37To see this formally, let sh,t ∈ {0,1} be an indicator for whether or not a household has survived in the panel
from t − 1 to t. A value of unity denotes survival. The direction of bias in the estimates of equation (1) will
depend on the sign of E[sh,tωh,t εh,t]. For the reasons stated above, we do not expect there to be much of a bias
for the components of this expectation which correspond to the agricultural shocks. However, for Earthquake
Damage, which we denote by Qh,t, we expect to see E[sh,tQh,t εh,t] < 0.
20All of these explanations have to do with non-random assignment of the shocks. Conse-
quently, investigating the plausibility of these alternative theories will involve testing whether or
not the shocks were, in fact, randomly assigned. In addition, we can gauge the plausibility of
these alternative stories by seeing if households that were aﬀected by the shocks also had unob-
servable characteristics that made them more or less disposed to migration even in the absence
of any shocks.
To start investigating these issues, we start out by looking into whether or not shocks are
predicted by baseline household characteristics. In Table 10, we regress each of the three
shocks on baseline characteristics from the 1997 survey. The characteristics that we use are the
household’s migrant level, land holdings, household size and the head’s education. As we can
see, the only signiﬁcant predictor of harvest loss is household size with larger households being
more likely to experience subsequent losses. However, the robustness of the agricultural shocks
to demographic controls in the previous section suggests that this is of little concern. In the
second column, we see that livestock loss is only predicted by the head’s education with more
educated households being less likely to experience livestock loss. It is important to emphasize
that subsequent agricultural shocks are not predicted by the baseline number of migrants in the
household as would be expected if households that were engaged in risky agricultural activities
also engaged in migration to hedge against risk ex ante. In addition, this casts doubt on the
alternative story where the agricultural shocks aﬀected households with stronger ties to the US.
Turning to the earthquakes, we see that households with less migrants abroad and with less
land were more likely to be severely hit by the earthquakes. This raises some concern that
households that were hit by the earthquakes would have been less likely to migrate irrespective
21of the disaster due to either the networks story or the liquidity constraints story.38
In Table 11, we further investigate the possibility that the results of the previous section are
confounded by these alternative stories by looking at the relationship between “counter-factual”
shocks and trends in migration and remittances. The counter-factual shocks that we employ are
the 2001 shocks merged into the 1999 data and the 1999 shocks merged into the 2001 data. We
do not use the actual shocks. In this exercise, we wish to test whether or not the shocks were
assigned to households that would have made the same migration decision even if they had not
been hit by the shock.
The ﬁrst column of the table re-states the results from the second column of Table 7 as a
benchmark. The second column is identical to the ﬁr s te x c e p tt h a tn o ww eu s et h ec o u n t e r -
factual shocks. As can be seen, nothing is signiﬁcant at conventional levels and, thus, there is no
evidence in favor of the competing theories. The last two columns look at trends in remittances
and remittances per migrant. The counter-factual shocks have no impact on neither trends in
remittances nor trends in remittances per migrant. The results of this table do not suggest that
the core results in Table 7 are the consequence of non-random assignment of shocks.
5 Migration, Liquidity Constraints and Earthquakes
The purpose of this section is twofold. Our primary objective is to further explore the role that
liquidity constraints play in the household’s migration decision. Our secondary objective is to
provide additional robustness checks which are facilitated by this section’s empirical framework.
38In the next section, we include all of the signiﬁcant predictors of shocks in our regressions to ensure that our
results are robust to non-random assignment. They are.
22Speciﬁc a l l y ,w eh a v et h r e ec o n c e r n s . T h eﬁrst and primary concern of this section is to
better understand to what extent the 2001 earthquakes stunted migration as a consequence
of the disruption of migration ﬁnancing. Second, we want to ensure that the eﬀects of the
earthquakes on migration are not driven by the earthquakes disproportionately aﬀecting poorer
households who may have had a harder time ﬁnancing migration. Finally, we also include all
other regressors from Table 10 that signiﬁcantly predicted shocks to ensure that the results of
Table 7 are not being driven by non-random assignment.39
We work with a modiﬁcation of equation (1). As we discussed earlier, one of the drawbacks
of the ordered model is that it assumes that a covariate that has a positive eﬀect on northward
migration must have a negative eﬀect on southward migration. This is an undesirable trait if
a covariate of interest, such as land holdings, which serves as a proxy for household wealth, has
a positive eﬀect on northward as well as southward migration. To address this issue, we break
the variable ∆Mh,t into two components: one that measures northward migration and one that
measures southward migration. Formally, we deﬁne these two components as
∆M
N
h,t = ∆Mh,t ∗ 1(∆Mh,t ≥ 0)
∆M
S
h,t = ∆Mh,t ∗ 1(∆Mh,t ≤ 0).
39It will become apparent to the reader why we could not have done this with the empirical model in Section
3.
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where Th,t is the total land holdings of the household and Qh,t is the earthquake damage index.40
The land variable that we use is Land 1, although, at the end of this section, we also check
to ensure that our results are robust to alternative measures. ωh,t is deﬁn e da si nS e c t i o n3 .
We use lags of the household’s land holdings to account for the fact that migration today may
have a contemporaneous impact on land transactions. In some of the speciﬁcations, we also
include the household’s migrant stock and the education of the household head from the 1997
data (both of which signiﬁcantly predicted some of the shocks in Table 10) as a ﬁnal robustness
check.41 Table 12 reports the results for southward migration and Table 13 reports the results
40It is important to note that these models estimate the impact of shocks on net northward or southward
migration.
41The impact of the 1997 migrant stock on migration in 1999 and 2001 is similar to the impact of land holdings
in the sense that it has a positive impact on northward migration and a negative impact on southward migration.
Accordingly, to assess the impact of the migrant stock it is essential that you break the migration variable into






5 for j ∈ {S,N} warrant some discussion. They are informative
the impact of wealth on the household’s migration decision. If migration is more common
among wealthier households then we will see that δ
N
4 > 0 and δ
S
4 < 0.42 While this would
be consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints, there are certainly alternative reasons
for a positive relationship between land holdings and migration.43 Consequently, a positive
relationship between wealth and migration should be interpreted as suggestive but by no means
conclusive evidence that liquidity constraints matter. The coeﬃcients δ
j
5 for j ∈ {S,N} allow
for non-linearities in the relationship between wealth and migration.
The coeﬃcients δ
j
6 for j ∈ {S,N} allow the impact of an earthquake shock of a given size to
vary with the household’s wealth level. This interaction is important because the presence of
liquidity constraints implies that, for example, $500 worth of damage will have a much greater
impact on a household’s ability to ﬁnance migration when they have no assets than when they
have $10,000 worth of assets. Thus, if the earthquakes disrupted migration because they aﬀected
migration ﬁnancing then we would expect to see that δ
N
6 > 0 since this would mean that the
earthquakes would have stunted migration for poorer households, who are more likely to face
liquidity constraints, more than they stunted migration for richer households, who are less likely
to face liquidity constraints. Turning to equation (4), if the household in El Salvador ﬁnances
the migrant’s return trip and if the earthquakes stunted migration as a consequence of liquidity
constraints, then we would expect to see that δ
S
6 < 0, since poorer households that were aﬀected
42When the dependent variable is southward migration, a positive (negative) coeﬃcient means that the variable
has a negative (positive) eﬀect on southward migration.
43For example, households with large land holdings may also be more likely to be engaged in risky agricultural
activities and, hence, more likely to use migration (either ex post or ex ante) to mitigate the impact of income
shocks.
25by the earthquakes would have been less able to pay the migration costs to bring household
members back from the US. However, since, anecdotally, we would expect the migrant and not
t h ef a m i l yb a c kh o m et oﬁnance return migration, we do not expect δ
S
6 to be that informative of
the interaction between liquidity constraints and the earthquakes.
In Table 12, we see that household wealth, as proxied by land holdings, is positively associated
with southward migration. The estimates of δ
S
4 are negative and highly signiﬁcant. So, we
see that wealthier households are more apt to have members migrate back from the US.44 In
columns 3 and 5 of the table, we see substantial evidence of non-linearities in the wealth-migration
relationship as shown by the positive and signiﬁcant estimates of δ
S
5 .45 This may be suggestive
that suﬃciently wealthy households do not need to rely on migration for supplemental income
or informal insurance.
Table 12 does not provide evidence that any of the shocks directly aﬀect southward migration.
However, it is interesting to note that in column 2, when we exclude the year dummy, the
earthquakes do have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on southward migration. Because southward migration
is not that frequent in our data, this may reﬂect a diﬃculty disentangling the eﬀects of the
earthquakes from the year eﬀect.46
The estimate of δ
S
6 in Table 12 is essentially zero in column 4, but is positive with a t-statistic
of unity in column 5 once we allow for a quadratic in land holdings. This is interesting for
44If we use household savings in lieu of land, we see that savings is also positively associated with southward
migration.
45The positive eﬀects of land holdings on migration that we observe in this section are consistent with empirical
results in Hoddinott (1994) in his analysis of migration in Kenya.
46A total of 141 households experienced southward migration in either 1999 or 2001. 95 of these households
experienced southward migration in 2001. Of these 95 households, 56 experienced some earthquake damage. We
believe that it is reasonable to expect that these small number make it diﬃcult to disentangle the earthquakes
from the year eﬀect in Table 12.
26two reasons. First, as argued above, if the earthquakes stunted migration as a consequence
of liquidity constraints and if the household in El Salvador ﬁnances return migration (a big if)
then we would expect to see a negative estimate which we do not see. Second, the positive
(but imprecise) estimate of the interaction suggests that southward migration, as a consequence
of the earthquakes, was more likely for poorer households than for richer households. What
this suggests is that wealthier households may have had alternative means at their disposal of
buﬀering the shock of the earthquakes other than bringing back family members from the US.
Finally, this provides additional evidence that the earthquakes may have induced southward
migration, although, these eﬀects appear to be concentrated among the poor.47
We now turn to Table 13 and look at the eﬀects of land holdings on northward migration.
In the table, we see that the estimates of δ
N
4 are all positive and highly signiﬁcant so that more
wealth is associated with northward migration.48 Once again, the results suggest that liquidity
constraints may be an important determinant of households’ ability to send members abroad.
However, we must stress once again that a positive relationship between migration and land
holdings is only suggestive of the presence of liquidity constraints. Completely analogous to
Table 12, the estimates of δ
N
5 are all negative and signiﬁcant suggesting non-linearities in the
migration/wealth relationship. Finally, the estimates of δ
N
6 in columns 3, 4 and 5 are very close
to zero and not signiﬁc a n t . A sa r g u e da b o v e ,t h i si sn o tw h a tw ew o u l dh a v ee x p e c t e dt os e ei f
the earthquakes stunted migration as a consequence of liquidity constraints.49
47The fact that we ﬁnd some, albeit tenuous, evidence of southward migration due to the earthquakes sheds an
interesting light on whether the earthquakes stunted migration as a consequence of credit constraints or increased
demand for labor at home. The reason for this is that if the only eﬀect of the earthquakes was to disrupt migration
ﬁnancing, then we would not expect to see any evidence of reverse migration due to earthquake damage.
48If we use savings in lieu of land holdings, we see that savings has a positive eﬀect on northward migration.
49An important issue concerning our tests for the importance of liquidity constraints is the presence of mea-
27In addition, Table 16 shows that the eﬀects of exogenous shocks on northward migration are
broadly consistent with the results in Table 7. We see that households that received adverse
agricultural shocks were more likely to experience northward migration. In addition, the table
shows that households that were severely aﬀected by the earthquakes were less apt to send
members to the US. The fact that the earthquakes are robust to the inclusion of land holdings is
important because it addresses a concern of Section 4 in which land holdings predicted earthquake
damage.
Another concern that was raised in Section 4 was that baseline migrants also predicted earth-
quake damage and that baseline education predicted livestock loss. To address this, the fourth
and ﬁfth columns of the table add baseline migrants and education as controls. In column
4, we add baseline migrants. We see that, while there is a positive relationship between the
household’s migrant stock in 1997 and subsequent migration, which we would expect if networks
matter, the point-estimate on earthquake damage remains unchanged and signiﬁcant. Overall,
this table does not lend any support to the alternative explanations concerning migrant networks
that were raised in Section 4. In column 5, we include both baseline migrants and baseline edu-
cation. While it is true that livestock loss is no longer signiﬁc a n t ,i tw a sa l s on o ts i g n i ﬁcant in
column 4 when baseline education was not included. Consequently, the lower point-estimate on
livestock loss in columns 4 and 5 probably has more to do with the sample size being reduced
by 100 observations than with the inclusion of baseline education.50
surement error in both land holdings and damage. In a linear model, classical measurement error will result in
attenuation bias with the degree of attenuation increasing with the R2 of the short regression of the interaction
term on the remaining covariates. However, in our case, the estimate of δ
S
6 is negative which is not consistent with
attenuation bias due to classical measurement errors. Nevertheless, the assumptions of classical measurement
error are quite restrictive and it is conceivable that a more complex form of measurement is operating in our
estimation. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to assess the plausibility of this scenario without alternative measures
of Earthquake Damage as well as all three land measures.
50The results in Table 10 suggested that earthquake damage may not have been randomly assigned to house-
28Finally, in Table 14, we ensure that our results are robust to diﬀerent measures of land
holdings. We report the coeﬃcients on land, land squared and the interaction of land and
earthquake damage using the three measures of land that are described in Section 2. As can be
seen in the table, our conclusions are not impacted in any way by our choice of land measure.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper investigated the relationship between idiosyncratic economic shocks in El Salvador
and migrant ﬂows to the US. To accomplish this, we utilized panel data from El Salvador
that contained good measures of economic shocks and migrant ﬂows. Our results indicate that
migration to the US is, in part, determined by the economic conditions which prevail in El
Salvador. Overall, this paper paints a picture in which Salvadoran households use migration as
an ex post risk management strategy.
We showed that adverse agricultural conditio n si nE lS a l v a d o rt e n d e dt op u s hh o u s e h o l d
members to the US. In the absence of any shocks, the average probability that a household
sends members abroad decreases by 24.26%. In addition, we provide evidence that the eﬀects
of agricultural shocks on migration are accompanied by increases in remittances that are on the
order of 40% - 60%.
In contrast, we showed that households that were aﬀected by the 2001 earthquakes tended to
holds. One of our strategies to address this concern was to add the signiﬁcant predictors of damage as controls
and check if damage was still signiﬁcant. This technique comes from the literature on treatment eﬀects. The
idea is that provided that the outcome (migration) is independent of the treatment (damage) conditional on a
set of covariates that predict treatment, the econometrician can identify the true impact of the treatment on the
outcome by regressing the outcome on the treatment and allc o v a r i a t e st h a tp r e d i c tt h et r e a t m e n t . T h i si sw h a t
Wooldridge (2000) refers to as a “kitchen sink regression.” For an excellent overview of treatment eﬀects using
binary treatments, see Wooldridge (2000).
29retain members at home. A one standard deviation increase in earthquake damage lowers the
average probability that a household sends someone to the US by 37.11%. One explanation for
this is that households retained labor at home to deal with the aftermath of the disaster. This
explanation states that the labor of household members was used to buﬀer the earthquake’s ef-
fects. Another explanation for this result is that Salvadoran households are liquidity constrained
and that the earthquakes disrupted household ﬁnances which would have otherwise been used to
ﬁnance migration.
To disentangle these two explanations from one-another, we investigated the nexus of migra-
tion, wealth and the earthquakes. First, we showed that migration is more likely for wealthier
households suggesting that liquidity constraints are important. However, we also showed that
the earthquakes were just as likely to stunt migration for wealthier households as they were
for poorer households which is not consistent with the story in which the earthquakes stunted
migration because they disrupted migration ﬁnancing.
Finally, an important topic which warrants additional work concerns the degree of cross-
sectional risk sharing that occurs between migrants and home dwellers via remittances. This
t o p i ci sc h a l l e n g i n ga si ti sv e r yd i ﬃcult to identify the direct eﬀect that adverse shocks will have
on remittances. The reason is that shocks will aﬀect remittances both directly and indirectly.
T h ed i r e c te ﬀect corresponds to cross-sectional risk pooling. The indirect eﬀect corresponds to
households using migration as a self-insurance mechanism, which is the focus of this paper. In
the absence of the stringent distributional assumptions that would be imposed by a complicated
structural model, identiﬁcation would entail using instruments which aﬀect migration but do not
aﬀect remittances. Finding valid instruments is likely to be diﬃcult if not impossible. Hence,
30progress on this front most likely will need to rely on structure and, of course, better data.
Another reason why this topic is challenging concerns the role that imperfect information would
play in risk pooling arrangements. As discussed by Rosenzweig (1988), the large distances
that can separate migrants from their families are likely to amplify the role that asymmetric
information will play in intra-family risk sharing arrangements.
7 Appendix 1 - Calculating the Marginal Impact of Shocks
We now provide the details concerning the calculation of the marginal eﬀects in Table 9. Let ωh,t
denote the shock vector as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3 . L e tωA
h,t h a v et h es a m ev a l u e sf o rt h ee a r t h q u a k e
shocks as in ωh,t, but have no agricultural disturbances. So, Harvest Loss and Livestock Loss
always equal zero in ωA
h,t. Alternatively, let ω
Q
h,t have the same values for the agricultural shocks
as ωh,t, but have a one standard increase in the level of earthquake damage. We then computed
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31The average probability of out-migration is then given by
p(∆Mh,t > 0|x)=( HT)
−1X
h,t
ph,t(∆Mh,t > 0|x) (8)
and the average probability of in-migration is then given by
p(∆Mh,t < 0|x)=( HT)
−1X
h,t
ph,t(∆Mh,t < 0|x) (9)
To calculate the marginal impact of the agricultural shocks, we then computed the average
probabilities in (8) and (9) for all households who experienced either a harvest loss or a livestock
loss evaluated at ωh,t. We then calculated these probabilities again for the same households
under the assumption that they did not experience any agricultural shocks i.e. using ωA
h,t.T o
calculate the marginal impact of the earthquakes, we computed (8) and (9) for all households in
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1 the number of household members




1,3 total amount remitted by all migrants in




1 the total land holdings in manzanas of the
household that has either a title or documents




1 the total land holdings in manzanas of the
household that has either a title, documents





1 the total land holdings in manzanas of the




2 dummy indicating income loss due to harvest loss 0.19
(0.39)
Livestock Loss
2 dummy indicating income loss due to harvest loss 0.11
(0.31)
Earthquake Damage
3,4 the cost of all household damage due to the 2001




5 Years of Education for the HH Head 2.78
(3.14)
1These descriptive statistics correspond to the years 1997, 1999, 2001.
2These descriptive statistics correspond to the years 1999 and 2001.
3These variables were deﬂated using the Salvadoran CPI.
4These descriptive statistics only correspond to 2001.
5These descriptive statistics correspond to 1997 and 1999.
37Table 2: Sample Sizes by Year
Number of Households
Households present in 2001, 689
– present in 1999 and present in 1997 572
– present in 1999 and absent in 1997 100
– absent in 1999 and present in 1997 1
– absent in 1999 and absent in 1997 16
Households present in 1999 696
– present in 2001 and present in 1997 572
– present in 2001 and absent in 1997 100
– absent in 2001 and present in 1997 21
– absent in 2001 and absent in 1997 3
Households present in 1997 623
– present in 2001 and present in 1999 572
– present in 2001 and absent in 1999 1
– absent in 2001 and present in 1999 21
– absent in 2001 and absent in 1999 29
38Table 3: The Distribution of Agricultural Shocks





















































∗This table reports the frequency of adverse agricultural events. The top
panel shows the distribution of households sustaining either harvest loss,
livestock loss or both. The middle panel shows the distribution of households
sustaining harvest loss. The bottom panel shows the distribution of households
sustaining livestock loss.
∗∗The top number in each cell corresponds to the number of households
sustaining the shock and the bottom number in each cell in parentheses
corresponds to the percentage of households sustaining the shock.
39Table 4: Summary of Earthquake Damage
Type of Damage Average Cost
1,2 Percentage of
Households Aﬀected
House Destroyed 868.94 10.3%
House Uninhabitable 767.92 6.7%
Major House Damage 777.79 14.6%
Minor House Damage 279.11 28.0%




Tools Used for Agricultural Production 1.71 0.01%
Machines Used for Agricultural Production 0.68 0.001%
Tools Used for Non-agricultural Production 2.27 0.01%
Machines Used for Non-agricultural Production 20.21 0.01%
Merchandise Meant to be Sold 11.19 0.02%
Stored Grains 11.74 0.02%
1All ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the Salvadoran CPI with 1992 as the base year.
2All ﬁgures are in dollars.
40Table 5: Demographic Characteristics



















































∗The table reports descriptive statistics for number of household
members at home in El Salvador within certain age and gender
brackets for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
1The column reports an F-test of the equality of means for
men and women. p-values are reported each F-statistic.













































Harvest Loss in 1999 --
−0.01
(−0.40) -
Livestock Loss in 1999 --
0.01
(0.59) -
































Demographics Included?2 No Yes Yes Yes
Department Dummies No Yes No Yes
















R2 0.0177 0.0546 0.041 0.0580
Households 623 623 696 623
∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗t-statistics in parentheses.
1For details concerning the construction of these variables, see section 2.5.
2For details concerning the construction of these variables, see section 2.3 or footnote 1 of Table 7.
3p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
42Table 7: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks














































Demographic Variables1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Municipio Dummies No No No No Yes
Department Dummies No No No Yes No





















Pseudo R2 0.0078 0.0072 0.0137 0.0177 0.0599
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where
the dependent variable is migration.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the
number of household members at home within certain age and gender
brackets. Details are in Section 2.3.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
43Table 8: Marginal Impact of Shocks
Northward Migration1 Southward Migration2
Agriculture Shocks
Actual Distribution3 0.2650 0.0914
Absence of Shocks4 0.2007 0.1262
% Change Between Rows 1 and 2 24.26% 38.07%
Earthquakes4
Actual Distribution3 0.2328 0.1073
One SD Increase5 0.1464 0.1682
% Change Between Rows 1 and 2 37.11% 56.76%
These are ﬁtted probabilities calculated using estimates of equation (1).
Further detail concerning the calculations can be found in the appendix.
1Northward migration corresponds to the probability of ∆Mh,t > 0.
2Southward migration corresponds to the probability of ∆Mh,t < 0.
3These probabilities were calculated using the actual distribution of shocks.
4These calculations only use the ﬁtted probabilities from 2001.
5These probabilities were calculated assuming that there were no agricultural shocks.
6This corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in the level (not the log) of damage.
44Table 9: Response of Household Remittances to Adverse Shocks













































Demographic Variables1 No Yes Yes No Yes
Municipio Dummies No No Yes No No
Department Dummies No Yes No No Yes




















R2 0.0210 0.1457 0.3442 0.0194 0.1319
Households 1385 1265 1265 1385 1265
Dependent Variable Remittances Remittances per Migrant
∗This table contains results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is remittances.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the number of
household members at home within certain age and gender brackets.
Details are given in section 2.3.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
45Table 10: Baseline Household Characteristics in 1997 and Shocks





























Department Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Households 1166 1166 1166
∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗t-statistics in parentheses.
46Table 11: Counterfactuals Shocks





















































Counter-factual Shocks?2 No Yes Yes Yes
Households 1265 1244 1244 1244
Dependent Variable Migrant-Diﬀs Migrant-Diﬀs Remit.-DiﬀsR e m i t . / M i g . - D i ﬀs
Estimation Method Ordered Logit Ordered Logit OLS OLS
∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗t-statistics in parentheses.
1p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
2Counter-factual shocks are the 2001 shocks merged into the 1999 data and the 1999 shocks
merged into the 2001 data.
47Table 12: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks - Southward Migration




























































Demographic Variables1 No No No No Yes





















Pseudo R2 0.0124 0.0033 0.0173 0.0148 0.0336
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where
the dependent variable is southward migration.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗∗These results use land 1 as the land variable.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the
number of household members at home within certain age and gender
brackets. Details are in section 2.3.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
48Table 13: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks - Northward Migration





































































Head’s Education in 1997 ----
0.03
(1.23)
Demographic Variables1 No No Yes Yes Yes





















Pseudo R2 0.0115 0.0156 0.0286 0.0340 0.0350
Households 1265 1265 1265 1165 1165
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where
the dependent variable is northward migration.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗∗These results use land 1 as the land variable.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the
number of household members at home within certain age and gender
brackets. Details are in section 2.3.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
49Table 14: Southward and Northward Migration Results with Alternative Land Measures
Southward Migration
Land 1 Land 2 Land 3
Earthquake






















































∗This table contains regressions like those in Tables 12 and 13 except that alternative land measures
have been used. Each regression includes the listed variables as well as the shock variables and
the year dummy.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Earthquake Damage (San Vicente)
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